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In the first chapter of this dissertation, we create original annual average years
of education across the major, present-day states of India from 1951 to 2011 in line
with work done by Turner et al.(2007). Drawing from multiple volumes of the decen-
nial censuses, Planning Commission reports, Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation databases and historical atlases to account for territorial changes
since independence, our data show that the average Indian worker had less than a
primary education even as late as 2011. However, this is still significantly more than
the years of education of the average Indian, with the disparity growing in later years.
We also construct original measures of real output per worker across the same pe-
riod. Using OLS on differenced data, time fixed effects, as well as dynamic panel
estimation, our results show an average return of between 20 and 25% to a year of
education. After ensuring that our data show no feedback effects from worker output
to future education, we use an endogenous fertility choice model created by Tamura
et al, to demonstrate that the increasing but varied rates of change in education levels
across all states are a result of declining mortality and increasing space costs. The
two factors lead parents to choose higher quality rather than quantity of children,
endowed with more education. To do this, we use census actuarial reports and life
tables to construct probabilities of young deaths (< 35 years of age) across the states
and time under consideration and calibrate the model with rent and taste parameters.
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We are able to fit the model to match fertility and average education levels seen in
the data.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, we study a panel dataset of Indian
states and examine the effect of economic freedom on the level of per capita income
and its growth for the years 2005-2013, years for which data are available. I use a
traditional Cobb-Douglas based Solow model for my analysis, using proxies for capi-
tal and human capital accumulation, augmented with CATO’s measure of economic
freedom. The results show a strong relationship between both level and growth of the
economy and freedom. Further, economic freedom is related to lower unemployment
rates and to a lower proportion of people living in poverty.
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Chapter 1
Education, Fertility and Incomes in
the States of India: A Study in
Mortality Driven Dynamics
Abir Mandal, Robert Tamura
India is the world’s third largest economy (on a purchasing power parity (PPP)
basis), but houses the world’s largest population of poor people. The enormity of these
numbers implies that the story of India’s economic transition to a modern regime
bears examination if we want to describe the decline in world poverty levels. Since
the time the country was granted Independence by the British, in 1947, many agencies
responsible for the collection and archival of macroeconomic data have been formed
and dissolved. However, there exists a lack of standardization and adequate time
series, which is essential for the study of the relationship between long-run economic
growth and the role of inputs.
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This is especially true at the state-level, where a constitutionally mandated
federal system has led to a multitude of bureaucracies, each of varying (and usually
low) effectiveness and output. As a result, the few historical subnational data collated
are not suitable for economic analysis, due to lack of standardization and lack of
clarity on the methodology used. This paper makes the following contributions: (1)
introduces original annual measures of average years of workforce schooling across the
states of India, from 1951 (formation of the republic) through 2011, (2) constructs
estimates of original real output per worker by state for the same period, (4) estimates
the returns to schooling as a robustness check(5) uses mortality driven fertility decline
to explain rising educational levels using an endogenous growth and fertility model
created by Tamura (2006).
To this end, we draw from a number of sources. We refer to multiple volumes of
the decennial census, starting from 1951 through 2011 to obtain population, workforce
and fertility data. Mortality rates were obtained from actuarial reports created by
government statisticians a few years after each census. Gross state product data came
from the now-defunct Planning Commission of India’s archives, which contain data
collected as a part of the Soviet-style Five-Year plans, formulated in 1950 by the first
prime-minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
In theory, the administrative setup created by the British (and inherited by the
first indigenous government) should make quantitative delineation of the economic
history of India and its constituents easy. However, in practice, political and bu-
reaucratic hurdles make the task complicated. First, at the time of independence, the
country consisted of fewer states and a large number of kingdoms of varying sizes. The
administrative machineries and consequent data collection mechanisms were hetero-
geneous. Even after these kingdoms were brought into the union as states, political
demarcations within India have changed several times, with the most recent state
2
(Telangana) carved out of the erstwhile undivided Andhra Pradesh as late as 2014.
As a result, the existing official data sources do not provide a common base across
which to analyze the present-day states in the nation. Third, the data collection pro-
cess has not been standardized or consistent across time and territories. Finally, large
periods of political unrest and strife led to suspension of even these very imperfect
data collection efforts. As examples of the last point, we cite the ongoing Islamic
violence in the northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir and the 1975 nationwide
state of emergency declared by prime-minister Indira Gandhi.
As a result of these challenges, a number of assumptions were made while
constructing the dataset, while also interpolating for missing or implausible data.
Despite these constraints, this is a much needed first step to come up with a dataset
that is actually amenable to further econometric research. While the dataset we
construct contains information on the newest and smallest states, in the interest of
accuracy and due to the lack of adequate data, they are not included in our analysis.
However, the 18 states that we have included contain approximately 93% of India’s
total population and spans all the regions of the country. Therefore, our analysis
should represent the subnational distribution of our measures reasonably well.
India in 1951 and in 2011
Here, we provide an overview of how the political demarcations within India
have changed between 1951 and 2011 to lend some perspective into the creation of a
uniform dataset that accurately describe over time the states as they exist today.
India gained its independence in August 1947, as a loosely knit amalgamation
of kingdoms and princely states, which were given the option of ascension to India
or Pakistan, or to exist as independent states. The union of the states acceding to
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India was formalized via ratification of the Constitution of India in 1950. Figure A.1
provides the administrative make up of the country immediately after. At that time,
there were 29 administrative units in the country, out of which only 17 were governed
via the legislature and bureaucracy. The remainder were semi-autonomous princely
states, the royal lineage of which were given substantial powers. This changed in
1956, with the States Reorganization Act; this incorporated all the states under the
constitutional authority of the central government, merging and carving up territories
on linguistic and cultural lines. At that time, Andhra Pradesh was created by merger
of the Hyderabad kingdom with Andhra State. Kerala and Karnataka (initially called
Mysore) were also created. While the Bombay state was augmented with Saurashtra
and Kutch with the 1956 Reorganization, the Bombay Reorganization Act of 1960
split up the state into Maharashtra and Gujarat. Gujarat comprised mainly of the
erstwhile Saurashtra and Kutch. The Punjab and East Punjab states were reorganized
via the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, which created Haryana, formalized the
modern Punjab state and enlarged Himachal Pradesh. Tamil Nadu was created out
of the Madras State in 1968. Chhattisgarh (out of Madhya Pradesh), Uttaranchal
(later named Uttarakhand, out of Uttar Pradesh) and Jharkhand (out of Bihar) were
all created in 2000. The newest state, Telangana, had a violent creation, amidst riots
and murders, in 2014 (see (Srikanth, 2013) for background). The map in Figure A.2
represents the present-day India. Table B.1 in Appendix II lists all the present day
states of India with their respective dates of formation.
For the purpose of data description, we have divided the country into five parts
by region. Fortuitously, the states in each region share similar geography, so as to
eliminate associated disparities within each group. Table 1.1 provides an overview of
the states we have analyzed and their respective regions in the country. Note that,
while we have listed Telangana as a separate state, since it was created in 2014, we
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Table 1.1: Regions of states of India
Region States
North
Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand
Central Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh
East Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal
West Gujarat,Maharashtra
South Andhra Pradesh,Karnataka,Kerala,Tamil Nadu,Telangana
have considered it only as a part of its parent state– Andhra Pradesh– for the purpose
of our analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
creation of data describing average years of schooling in the work force. We also
present an overview of our findings broken down by region graphically and in tabular
form. Then we present our estimates of state output per worker. Subsequently, we
test the created measures by estimating returns to schooling and comparing them
with generally seen values. Then we suggest decreasing probablity of young adult
deaths as the explanation for the decrease in fertility and increase in average years of
schooling in the workforce. We propose an endogenous fertility model as a framework
for such a phenomenon. We calibrate this model to generate estimates of fertility and
average education to fit our data. Lastly, we discuss the broader implications of our
findings.
Education in India
Similar to Turner et al. (2007), we believe that in order to study the link
between human capital and income, measuring the average education in the labor
force is more pertinent than the entire population. The “Workers and Occupations”
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Volumes of the Census, introduced in 1961, enumerates workers based on their educa-
tional achievement. India has historically suffered from low labor force participation.
Between 1951 and 1961, the labor force participation rate was 38-40% of the popula-
tion. While it reached a high of about 60% in 1991, in our last year of analysis (2011),
only 54.8% of the eligible population worked. Thus, a major chunk of the popula-
tion depends on a minority of working population. This is perhaps also the reason
why India traditionally had low rates of savings, since sustenance of its working and
non-working population likely required the majority of its already low income to be
consumed on basic necessities.
With respect to the census of workers, the classifications of workforce education
levels are not consistent year to year. For example, the 1971 Census lists workers with
primary education (4 years) and no higher, while the 2001 Census lists workers who are
”Matric/secondary but below graduate”. The challenge in our study was to attribute
an appropriate number of years of schooling to each classification. Furthermore, we
had to interpret whether the term, ”worker”, meant the entire labor force, or the
currently employed, and if so, only those fully employed, or temporary workers as
well, so as to construct a uniformly measured set of data. For 1951, worker data
were not available; however, state populations were divided by educational levels.
We assume that the labor force participation rate within each educational level in
1951 was the same as in 1961 to construct our average years of schooling for that
year.
Eventually, we constructed average years of schooling in the labor force for
each census year using the following formula:





where yrst is the number of years corresponding to a given level of education in year
t, while Pit is the share of total workforce with yrst years of education in state i in
year t.
There is a structural break in the way we handled the classification, “liter-
ate”, as given in the census. Prior to 1991, the Indian government defined the term
as someone able to read and write his or her own name. Subsequent to 1991, the
government released a more rigorous definition of the term, asserting that a literate
person “should be able to read and write and perform arithmetic operations suffi-
ciently so as to function properly in society and execute contracts” (NLM).
As such, before 1991, we assign 0 years of schooling to people with only liter-
acy and no other formal schooling, while for 1991 and beyond, we assign three years
of education to workers classified as just literate. We have to caution here that the
classification of literate or illiterate by the Indian government seems to be function-
ally irrelevant. While referring to data contained in a 2003 ORG Center for Social
Research (located in Baroda, Gujarat, but now defunct and replaced) report cov-
ering five states–Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Gujarat–
Kothari et al. (2004) found that while 68.2% claim to be literate in the sample, only
12% among them could read an assigned paragraph with conviction, while 36.3% had
reading difficulties. 51.7% could not read at all! In fact, only 37.5% could even write
their full name correctly. 52% could not read the bus schedule, critical to people
moving around in the absence of private transport, 56% could not read a newspaper,
54.8% could not read letters, and 56.7% could not write a letter. Thus, our job of
creating an index of educational attainment becomes even more important to mea-
sure the level of human capital in the state economies. Table B.4 in the Appendix
provides an overview of the proportion of population in each state deemed officially
illiterate by the government.
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Table 1.2: Average years of education in workforce
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Central 0.60 0.81 1.63 1.91 2.77 4.85 6.37
East 1.06 1.37 2.39 2.82 3.57 5.08 6.79
North 0.58 1.15 2.08 2.81 3.96 5.58 7.42
South 1.00 1.43 2.67 3.09 3.82 5.58 7.55
West 1.13 1.79 2.80 3.45 4.53 6.47 8.19
India 0.89 1.35 2.37 2.90 3.82 5.53 7.32
Table 1.2 provides our constructed measures of average education weighted by
the workforce and grouped by the broad regions of the country. The country as a
whole had less than a year of average schooling in the workforce at around the time it
gained independence. The northern and central regions of the country lagged behind
the others by a significant margin. By 1981, the North had almost caught up to the
country-average, and had surpassed it by 1991, thanks to the capital city of New
Delhi, which attracted educated workers to its bureaucracy and related sectors. The
Central region continued to lag behind the others throughout our study period and
continues to do so in 2011, in which its workforce has almost a year less education
than the average worker of the country. The West, encompassing the industrial states
of Gujarat and Maharashtra, has maintained its lead in education, with its workforce
possessing eight-tenths of a year more education than the rest of the country. Despite
these dynamics, the country as a whole remains poorly educated, contrary to its image
as a technology and outsourcing hub. We note that the average worker possesses
less than a primary education, possibly explaining why it still remains desperately
poor. The West is the only region in which the labor force has more than a primary
education on average. Figure A.3 exhibits the average years of education in the labor
force across our analysis period by the regions of the country.
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Table 1.3: UNDP Average Years of Schooling
1980 1990 2000 2011
1.9 3 4.4 5.4
For comparison, we include in Table 1.3, the United Nations Development
Programme’s own measures of average years of schooling in the entire population
from 1980, which unsurprisingly shows the workforce to be significantly more educated
than the population at large. The divergence between the average years of education
in the workforce versus that in the population in general is about a year in the 1980s,
expanding to almost two years by 2011. This suggests a higher skills requirements of
the new jobs created in the modern Indian economy.
Table 1.4: Maximum schooling gaps between regions and states
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
S 2.07 4.27 4.87 5.13 5.78 5.24 5.04
R 0.55 0.98 1.17 1.54 1.76 1.62 1.82
Table 1.4 shows the gaps between the states, in the row marked S, and re-
gions, in the row marked R, with the highest average years of workforce schooling
and those with the lowest. Workers in Delhi have a little above five more years of
education on the average than their counterpart in Bihar. Both gaps have increased
since independence, owing to a vast differential in enrollment rates. For example, in
1951, Gujarat (West) had a primary enrollment rate of almost 55% and a secondary
enrollment rate of around 15%. In comparison, Rajasthan and Haryana (North) had
only 15% of its age appropriate citizens attending primary school. In 2011, however,
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primary enrollment rates are 90% or higher in all states of the country but one, so
we should see some convergence in the future.
State output per worker
This section presents our estimates on state per worker output converted into
real 2004 PPP dollars. The Indian government releases gross product data for each
state, commencing in 1961. However, these data are not comparable across time for
every state due to the intertemporal flux in political boundaries within the country
and are not directly useful. In order to construct consistent estimates, we divided
the originally provided GSPs by the populations as given in the Census books to
obtain the per capita income of each state. We also obtain estimates for labor force
participation using the total number of workers in the economics tables of the Census
and dividing by the population given in the Census books. Fortunately, the Registrar
General of India has released adjusted populations of states from 1951 through 2001
based on the revised boundaries, as of 2006. We multiply the per capita income
obtained above to the revised population estimates to get revised GSP for each Census
year. Then we obtain the number of workers using the labor force participation
estimates and calculated the per worker output by dividing the revised GSP by our
measure of state labor force. All amounts are converted to 2004 PPP dollar values
using the deflator estimates obtained from the Planning Commission and publicly
available exchange rates. Data for 1951 are estimated using the national 1951-1961
real growth rate and assuming that the growth rates of individual states were the
same number of standard deviations above or below the national rate in 1951 as in
1961.
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Table 1.5: Estimates of Gross State Product per Worker 1951-2011 (PPP$ 2004)
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 %/year
Central 807 1442 1653 2556 3588 3171 5606 3.28
East 2044 2120 2200 2843 3377 3201 4991 1.49
North 1804 2053 2348 2987 4093 4652 9002 2.68
South 1444 1715 1980 2187 3310 4651 10949 3.38
West 2106 2330 2669 3401 4643 6076 13259 3.07
India 1709 1933 2182 2685 3752 4297 7994 2.60
Max
Min
Region 2.61 1.62 1.61 1.55 1.40 1.92 2.66
Max
Min
State 6.36 3.50 3.23 4.31 3.71 6.74 8.61
Table 1.5 provides our estimates of real per worker output in the states of India
aggregated by the five broad regions. The data show that following Independence, the
workers in the industrial western states were more productive than their counterparts
in the other regions, a position they have maintained throughout our study period.
While we see some evidence of convergence amongst the regions thereafter, the gap
increased substantially in the 1991-2011 period. The ratio of the maximum to the
minimum regional average declined to 1.4 by 1991, but increased to 1.92 and 2.66,
respectively, in 2001 and 2011. In 2011, the least productive region was the east,
which was behind only the west in 1951, possibly a consequence of six decades of rule
of populist economic policies (see Pedersen (2001)).
Further, in 1951, the least productive state was the tribal and rural Madhya
Pradesh, in Central India. Workers in the state of Delhi were the most productive
by far, followed by those in West Bengal. In 2011, Delhi workers remained the most
productive, with an output per worker almost twice that of the next two states– the
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newly created Uttarakhand and the services hub of Haryana (Chatterji (2013) details
the rise of the latter comprehensively). On the other end of the scale, we have the
eastern states of Odisha and Bihar. By the end of our analysis period, we see as wide
a gap, or wider, than at independence.
Reforms and their results
The reforms enacted by the Indian government under the threat of sovereign
default in 1991 under the aegis of the then-finance minister and eventual Prime Minis-
ter, Dr. Manmohan Singh, are well known. However, less prominent, but nevertheless
important reforms took place in the mid-1980s as well, under the prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi. We will attempt to provide a brief overview of the reform process.
Centrally planned industry was the hallmark of the Indian economy from the
very beginning with the introduction of Industries Act of 1951, under which a license
was needed to set up a new facility or to expand an existing one. Thus, while osten-
sibly the Indian government allowed the private sector to exist, it de facto controlled
the quantity and location of every investment. When Rajiv Gandhi came into power
on a wave of sympathy, after his mother, ex-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, was assas-
sinated in 1984, he began the deregulation process, eliminating licenses for one-third
of all industries (Rodrik et al., 2004). The second round of reforms was in 1991 under
prime minister Narasimha Rao, after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in Sri Lanka.
Some argue that his hand was forced by a balance of payments crisis, subsequent to
which the IMF imposed the reforms as a precondition to allowing a line of foreign
exchange credit to the country. Industrial licensing was no longer required, except
for a small number of industries deemed strategic or polluting. At the same time,
foreign direct investment was initially allowed in a few sectors, eventually giving way
to broad based liberalization in this policy as well. As a result, FDI increased from a
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paltry USD 129 million in 1991 to a peak of USD 48 billion in 2008, before declining to
USD 35 billion in 2014 (Dutta and Sarma, 2008). At the same time, tariffs, including
those on capital goods and food grains, were reduced. This allowed industrial houses
to substitute between labor and capital and introduced competition in the large but
already low-profit food market.
Ignoring causality concerns, our data show that not all parts of the country
benefited from the reforms– the East and Central regions saw a decline in labor pro-
ductivity, with the Central region suffering the most. This can perhaps be explained
by the fact that the two biggest beneficiaries of reforms– trade and services– were
concentrated mainly in the West and South. The South contains the dynamic IT
outsourcing cities of Hyderabad and Bangalore, along with the automotive industrial
hub of Chennai (earlier known as Madras). The West contains the financial and trade
center of Mumbai (Bombay) and the business-friendly state of Gujarat. The Central
and East regions, on the contrary, consist of low value and slow growth sectors of
agriculture and mining. Further, we see that productivity growth, even in the regions
benefiting most from the reforms, only accelerated in the period post 2001. Our find-
ings are consistent with those of Dougherty et al. (2010), which found that a lack
of labor mobility, due to transport and relocation costs, precluded the agricultural
sector from experiencing a regime of labor productivity growth and that the majority
of growth seen even in the services sector occurred after 2000.
In terms of changes, the South, Central, and North regions saw an average
rate of growth of above 3% in per worker output over the 60 year period, with most
of the gains coming in 2001-2011, in which they saw growth rates of around 9%, 6%
and 7%, respectively . On the other hand, the Eastern states of Bihar, West Bengal,
Orissa and Assam saw a growth rate of 1.5% in per worker output, growing 4.5%
over 2001-2011. Our findings are consistent with those of Bhattacharya and Sakthivel
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(2004), which estimated that the overwhelming share of post-reform economic growth
could be attributed to industrial and service-based states, while the states with large
primary sectors languished. Figure A.4 shows the change in per worker output by
region over 1951-2011.
Part of the reason for this disparity is the high growth-states’ ability to at-
tract service sector investments. This can be traced back to the empowerment of state
administrations after the reforms, prior to which the federal Planning Commission
dictated where investments would go. After the reforms, some states, like Andhra
Pradesh and Gujarat, openly embraced free market policies, while others, such as
Kerala and Bihar chose the political safety of populist regimes(Loraine Kennedy and
Zamuner, 2013). The results can be seen in the growth rate data (Table 1.5). Bhat-
tacharya and Sakthivel (2004) agree with this explanation, as do Aghion et al. (2008),
who show that states that enacted pro-industry rather than pro-worker regulations
post-reforms benefited from reforms in terms of faster economic growth.
Returns to education
In order to examine the validity of our estimates of education and output per
worker, we estimate returns to education to see if we obtain figures reasonable for a
country like India. We make some assumptions since we do not have data on other
inputs, such as physical capital. The first thing we assume is free factor mobility
across states, while the second is perfect competition in factor markets. While these
assumptions are questionable for a country like India, especially pre-liberalization,
there has never been a restriction on cross-state migration of labor. Further, while
the economy was planned, the planners were not restricted from freely deciding the
allocation of new investment or reallocating existing investment to a new state.
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In what follows, we mimic Turner et al. (2007). Consider a model with two
factors of production, human capital and all other inputs which we call physical
capital. We assume production of a single final output is Cobb-Douglas. Output per






where kit is the physical capital per worker and hit is the human capital per worker.
To simplify, assuming perfect competition in output market, with final output as
numeraire, the representative firm solves:
max
kit,hit
{Aitkαit(human capital)it)1−α − rtkit − wt(human capital)it} (1.2)
where rt and wt are rental rate per unit of capital and human capital, respectively.




















We assume that human capital can be specified in a Mincerian fashion:
human capitalit = exp βEit + γxit, (1.5)
where Eit is the average number of years of education in the workforce of state
i in year t and xit is the average number of years of experience for the same.
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Workforce survey data were not available to obtain average experience for the
states. In order to construct our measure of relative experience, we calculate the
average age of the population not enrolled in school and below the age of retirement
in India, 60. From that, we subtract the average years of education in the workforce
for the state and year and the 5.5 years it takes children to begin enrollment. While
enrollment in the first grade begins at the age of 6 years, students who go to school
in India typically, but not always, attend kindergarten as well, approximately a year
earlier.
Using this definition of human capital, the earnings regression is:








+ βEit + γxit (1.6)
Assuming that all states have a common level of total factor productivity, we
can estimate β by using time dummies in a pooled panel dataset. The results of the
regression are given in column one of Table 1.6.
Under the hypothesis that TFP does not differ across states, i.e., Ait = At for
all i, differencing each states log output per worker from the labor force weighted log
national output per worker, years of schooling, and average experience from the labor
force weighted averages allows for the estimation of the earnings equation without
any time controls. The differenced regression is reported in column two.
We may also consider the case that TFP may vary from state to state or every
state can have some traits or institutions unique to it that would affect its labor
product, all else being equal.
To account for this, we can rewrite equation 1.6 as:
ln yit = ci + bt + βEit + γxit (1.7)
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To account for this, we could use a state fixed effects model, with time dum-
mies, as long as there is no feedback from income to education in a future period. We
check whether present levels of income affect future education using a fixed effects
panel regression. The results of the regression (see Table B.2 in Appendix II) suggest
the parameter on the future value of education, with respect to present income, is
not significantly different than 0, allowing us to consider the state fixed effects model
with time dummies. Due to the fact that we only have a maximum of 7 observations
per state (T<N), we estimated a dynamic panel regression instead of using a two-way,
fixed-effects panel.
We end up dropping the experience variable from our final regression because
the difference in experience between states was not significant and since we only
had decadal data. Further, the coefficient on experience was no different than 0,
at the usual significance levels. This was likely because the majority of the labor
force in India was in the agricultural or other primary occupations, and it is unlikely
its productivity would be enhanced by experience greater than one or two years.
Thus, our estimate of returns to human capital and education are the same. For
those interested, Table B.3 in the appendix contains our constructed measures of the
average experience across states and time.
The results of the dynamic regression are given in column 3.
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Table 1.6: Earnings regressions: Decadal data (Standard error)
E 0.2489*** 0.2500*** 0.2029***
(0.0238) (0.0215) (0.0037)
N 130 130 130
R2 0.83 0.53 -
Year dummies Yes No Yes
State fixed effects No No Yes
Differenced No Yes No
Our results suggest a return of between 20 to 25% of real per-worker output
to every year of education. This does not necessarily translate into additional income
for the worker, but rather suggests that firms can use higher education as a signal
for more productive workers. Our estimates are higher than the approximately 15%
estimated by Turner et al. (2007) for the United States. However, that is expected
given the enormous difference in levels of education and income between the two
countries, since declining returns are expected beyond some threshold.
Previous research on India mostly examine returns to education on wage in-
come or consumption. Duraisamy (2000) finds, for 1993 wage survey data, private
rates of return to education in India increase up to the secondary level and diminish
afterwards. At the primary, middle, secondary, higher-secondary and post-secondary
levels, he asserts that each additional year of education leads to 7.9, 7.4, 17.3, 9.3
and 11.7%, respectively, of higher income. Vasudeva Dutta (2006), however, finds the
wage premium of post-secondary education to that of primary education widening be-
tween 1983 and 1999. He asserts that this is due to the higher skill nature of the jobs
created by trade liberalization and reforms of the 1990s at the expense of demand for
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low skilled workers. In line with this, Agrawal (2012) finds no evidence of declining
returns to education in India and suggests higher dividends to post-secondary level
education. We cannot comment on such differences between levels since our expected
levels of education across all states are so low, and even by 2011, no state had a
human capital level equivalent to a high school diploma (12th grade).
The implication of our results is that a worker with primary (8 years) of
education is expected to be between 4 and 5.9 times as productive as person with no
education. Further, workers with approximately 11 years of education, the highest
average amongst the states (Delhi), are expected to be 2.5 and 3 times as productive
as those with about 6 years of education, the lowest among the states (Bihar).
Human capital and secular fertility decline
Noting that present income is not a significant predictor of future education,
we now turn to the question of why the levels of education in Indian states increased
and why we see the varied time paths that we do. In this section, we present a model
of secular fertility decline and increase in average education of workforce in the states
of India as an identification exercise. Principally, we identify declining mortality risk
as the cause of declining fertility, similar to Tamura (2006). In addition, replicating
Tamura and Simon (2017), we also add to the model relative differences between states
of changes in opportunity cost of land (rent), as different parts of India transitioned
to modern economies at different rates.
The model focuses on fertility, x, as a parental choice; human capital of their
children, h’; a composite consumption good, c; and space, S. Parents respond to the
probability of young adult mortality in making their choices.
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φ[(1− δ)xt − a]1−φ + Λhφt+1 −
βδνtt
[(1− δt)xt − a](1− δt)ε
, (1.8)
where ν is a time varying preference parameter. ψ denotes the expenditure shares
of adult consumption and space. The young adult mortality rate is given by δ and,
similar to Jones (2001) we assume that parents only care about the net fertility, given
by (1− δ)x− a, a ≥ 0. This implies that the elasticity of substitution of net expected
fertility with human capital investments is greater than 1, which is the elasticity of
substitution between net expected fertility and space as well. The last term, in which
ε > 0, captures precautionary demand for fertility, similar to Kalemli-Ozcan (2002,
2003), and Tamura (2006). The precautionary demand becomes increasingly small as
the probability of young mortality falls, and is essentially 0 for developed countries.
The parents face the following budget constraint:
ct + rtxtSt = ht[1− xt(θ + κtτt)] (1.9)
where θ is the time cost of raising children, τ is the time spent educating children, κ is
the inverse efficiency of education time–implying efficiency decreases when κ increases
and r is the price of space.











where τ t is the average time spent in education and is an external effect of school-
ing. The fact that ρt > 0 signifies that while schooling is positive, the children can
benefit from the existence of higher levels of human capital in the world. The more
education society provides on average to its children, the more it can benefit from
learning as opposed to innovating and discovering by itself. This effect is maximized
at τ = .38125, which for a 40 year period occurs at 15.25 years of schooling. This
accumulation technology is similar to Tamura (1991, 2006) and Tamura et al. (2016).
ht is the frontier human capital and is assumed to be the human capital of the United
States for all the states in our work.
Substituting 1.10 and 1.9 into 1.8, we get the Euler equations determining
















t [(1− δt)xt − a]1−φ[ht[θ + κtτt] + rtSt]
=(1− φ)αcψφt S
(1−ψ)φ
t [(1− δt)xt − a]−φ(1− δt) +
βδνtt






t [(1− δt)xt − a]1−φrtxt
= α(1− ψ)φcψφt S
(1−ψ)φ−1
t [(1− δt)xt − a]1−φ
(1.14)






Substituting ct into the budget constraint:
rtxtSt = (1− ψ)ht[1− xt(θ + κtτt)] (1.16)
Substituting this back into the preference function produces the following op-











[(1− δt)xt − a]−1
 (1.17)
The equation shows that we have fertility rate, x, decreasing with a decline in
young adult mortality, δ, as an interaction relationship between the price of space,
r and fertility. Due to the interaction of fertility with space cost and human capital
investments, the budget constraint is not convex– implying that we may not have an
interior solution and require a numerical method to solve the problem. We solve the
problem by taking into consideration that for a given level of fertility, the problem is
concave in (c, S, τ). Therefore, we use a grid over possible values of fertility to solve the
household’s problem, subsequently choosing the fertility that maximizes utility. Our
parameters chosen for preferences (α, ψ, φ, a) and technology (ρ, µ) produce interior
solutions for (x, c, S, τ).
We solve the model for each state from 1951 through 2011, producing fertil-
ity, schooling choice and human capital for that birth cohort, interpolating δ for the
intervening years between censuses. This allows us to compute the stock of human
capital in the population. This is used to judge the goodness of fit of the model.
Our numerical solution indicate the rise in price of space as a major factor in the
fall of fertility rates across the country, along with the decline in mortality rate. We
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are approximately able to replicate the pattern of fertility and human capital stock
observed over our study period in the states of India. Our simulation is consistent
with the economic history of the country. Right after independence, with widespread
poverty and lack of access to healthcare, the population of India was afflicted with
high infant mortality and consequent high young adult mortality rates. This made
parents choose high precautionary fertility. However, high fertility implied that im-
parting their children with education was expensive, and parents chose lower levels
of schooling for them. As mortality fell, the precautionary demand declined, lead-
ing to lower fertility. At the same time, the increasing opportunity cost of space, as
India’s population exploded and the country developed, making it more profitable
to undertake commerce, industry and agriculture on land instead of utilizing it for
dwelling, also made raising children more expensive, leading to lower fertility. How-
ever, this meant that the opportunity cost of children quality declined, leading to
parents choosing to educate their children more, aided by public policy measures (see
Kumar (2004), Ghosh (2000)).
We seed the initial level of human capital, as per data, and then we use the
parameters, κ and r, to calibrate the model and match the observed rise in human
capital across the country.
Numerical Solutions
Here, we analyze the stationary solution to our model and present the nu-
merical solutions. We assume that the stationary fertility rate is 1. Thus, India is
yet far away from stationarity with respect all our estimated values. With our Euler
equation for fertility when mortality risk is 0, we can impose the following restriction
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on a as a function of parameters and the stationary human capital investment, τ :
a = 1− (1− φ)(1− [θ + τ ])
φ(1− ψ(1− [θ + τ ]))
(1.18)
We also have an implicit function determining the stationary human capital
investment rate, τ :
1 =
Λµ[Ar1−ψ]φ(1− θ − τ)1−φ
α[ψψ(1− ψ)1−ψ]φ(1− a)1−φτ 1−µφ
, (1.19)
where, under the balanced growth path, ht = ht and the right hand side value is
constant. Under these restrictions and the convergence of mortality risk to 0, the long
run fertility rate, x, will be 1 and human capital investment, τ = τ . Table B.6 gives
the parameter values common to all the states. Most of our parameter choices are
standard. The time cost of rearing a child, θ = 0.125, implies a biological maximum
fertility of 8 in an asexual model, or 16 in a model with both sexes. Our choice of
τ = .38125 implies a steady state value of 15.125 years of schooling, consistent with
the developed country measures of Tamura (2006); Tamura and Simon (2017).
Young adult mortality risk, δ
In order to calculate our measure of young adult mortality risk, we used actual
life tables for each state released by the government in the Census reports from
1971 through 2011. For 1951 and 1961, the government only released life tables
by region and, thus, we estimate these probabilities for the states, based on their
relative mortalities as compared to the respective regional averages in 1971. For
example, if a state’s mortality for a certain age group is a certain number of standard
deviations above or below its regional average in 1971, we estimated its 1961 and
1951 probability to be the same number of standard deviations above or below the
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corresponding regional averages provided by the Census. We understand that such
a method may not be very accurate, but we believe the estimates are at the very
least reasonable, given the smoothness of the actual data for the latter years, and
the best available in the literature thus far. Using the data available and those that
we estimated, we calculated δ as the risk of death before the age of 35 utilizing the
Kaplan-Meier method to first calculate the probability of surviving till the age of 35
and the subtracting that value from 1.
For 1971 onwards, we weighted down the 0-4 year probability of dying by .87
to account for the fact that an infant death is less costly to replace than the death
of older children. This is also consistent with Tamura and Simon (2017), which uses
separate data for the infant mortality rate and 1-4 years data and discounts the IMR
by two-thirds. This is because with each passing year, the woman loses another year
of her child bearing ability as well as the human capital investment made in the child,
if it dies. The life tables have mortality data for only the entire age range of 35 to
39. To get the probability of death at just 35, we assume a uniform distribution and
calculate P (death at 35) =
P (Death between 35 and 39)
5
.
Mathematically, to clarify, for 1971 through 2011, our probability of dying
before 35 is calculated in this manner:
δ = 1− [1− .87P (0− 4)][1−P (5− 9)][1−P (10− 14)] . . . [1−P (30− 34)].[1−P (35)]
(1.20)
For 1951 and 1961, we have data at every single age and so we calculated,
δ = 1− [1− .33P (0)]
35∏
i=1
[1− P (i)], (1.21)
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where, again, we weighed the infant mortality rate by a third.
Results
Using these data and our solution, we generate data on Total Fertility Rate
(TFR) and average years of schooling. We then plot these generated series with
plots of actual data for these two measures. The model solutions are generated by
solving the Euler equation for τt for each fertility value, selecting the one generating
the highest utility as optimal. This method is used so as to allow for the possibility
of corner solutions, since the budget set is not convex. For each state i, we allow
νit, rit, κit to vary in year t to fit the observed fertility and average schooling data as
closely as possible.
TFR data were retrieved from the Fertility Volumes of the Census Reports
for 1961 through 2011. Values were imputed for reconstructed states as well as for
the year 1951, for which the government did not collect or release state level data,
assuming each state was the same number of standard deviations above or below the
national average in 1951 as it was in 1961.
By 2011, many states had TFR similar to or lower than that of the United
States, as a comparison. These include Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Punjab and West
Bengal. Himachal Pradesh had the lowest fertility in that year (1.14). On the other
hand, states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan had TFR of around 3 or
above. The average fertility rate in the country declined from around 6 in 1951 to
2.3 in 2011 (see Table B.5).
With respect to ”rental rate”, r, or the price of space, a couple of factors
are at play. India is a very rural country even today, but was overwhelmingly rural
in 1951. In 1951, 83% of Indians lived in rural areas (Datta, 2006), as compared
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to 67% in 2011 (The World Bank, 2016). A rural area would typically have lower
population densities and would have a majority of its land mass devoted to low
return agricultural and other primary activities (low scale forestry, non-commercial
scale mineral gathering etc.). Means of communication, inter-region transport of
goods and people and alternate sources of employment were non-existent in 1951 and
remain restricted even today. As such, the marginal space cost of another child was
negligible on average. This started changing as India industrialized and the service
industry became more prominent. The severe land scarcity in India’s biggest cities
forced the new foreign (owing to a more liberal FDI policy) and domestic companies to
expand to the hinterland and communications started improving substantially due to
the proliferation of cellphones. As a result, it became more profitable to use land for
purposes other than habitation, increasing the opportunity cost of the marginal child.
At the same time, since the fertility rate was significantly above the replacement rate
of 2.1 (and remains, on average, slightly higher even today), a significantly decreasing
time trend in per capita land availability was observed throughout our study period.
This also increased the space cost over time of a child. A prime example of this
phenomenon is the state of Haryana, overwhelmingly rural and agricultural at India’s
founding. Space constraints in Delhi forced companies to relocate to the erstwhile
village of Gurgaon, Haryana, around 40 km away. From its origins as a dusty, semi-
arable land mass, Gurgaon is one of the largest information technology and financial
services hub in Asia, with some of the priciest real estate in the country. Such
stories have been repeated in almost all states of the country, in varying degree. On
the other side, putting downward pressure on land cost have been technologies and
infrastructure making previously wild and inhabitable places available for settlement.
While we do not have such state level data across time to illustrate these
phenomenon, our calibrated rental rates point to the domination of the increasing
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alternate use and population density effects, especially subsequent to the first and
second round of economic reforms during the 80s and 90s. Graphs in figures C.21
through C.36 show the transition of our calibrated ”rental rates”.
Figures C.5 to C.20 in Appendix II illustrate the data against our model
estimates of fertility and average years of education of the major states for which
we could compile complete or nearly complete data. After seeding the initial level
of human capital, and calibrating values for the parameters, we were able to fit our
model to the time paths of fertility and human capital very well.
Goodness of fit and returns to model human capital
In order to verify the estimates for fertility and average education levels gen-
erated by our model, we first regress the model estimates on the actual data. If the
model is correct, we expect to see a slope coefficient not significantly different than
1.
The OLS coefficient for the TFR data on model estimates of the TFR was
1.0003. Further, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
our model estimate was equal to 1 at the usual significance levels. While we rejected
the null in the case of schooling at the 10% level, the coefficient on the model estimate
was .98, almost 1. Further, OLS on a log-log specification indicated an elasticity of 1
on both model estimates on with respect to their data counterparts.
Further, we test the model estimates of education to obtain returns on our
calculated output per worker data. We use the same methodologies that we used to
calculate our data estimates of return to education. Table 1.7 shows the results of
our regression for the model years of education.
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Table 1.7: Output per worker regressions: Decadal endogenous fertility model
estimates (Standard error)
Ê 0.2365*** 0.2348*** 0.2280***
(0.0233) (0.0219) (0.0033)
N 112 112 112
R2 0.80 0.44 -
Year dummies Yes No Yes
State fixed effects No No Yes
Differenced No Yes No
Table 1.8 provides a comparison between the returns to education obtained
from our data and from the model estimates. The returns are pretty similar across
the board and range from 23 to 24% for the model estimates, as compared to 20 to
25% from our data.
Table 1.8: Comparison of data and model returns to education
E Ê
Time dummies 0.2489 0.2365
Differenced 0.2500 0.2348
Dynamic Panel 0.2029 0.2280
We also run a regression of model-generated human capital on output per
worker (Table 1.9). The pooled OLS method provides a coefficient of 9.8% on real
output, while the dynamic panel method gives us an estimated coefficient of 10.6%,
which are very reasonable as per existing literature.
These evidence make us confident about the validity of our endogenous fertility
model to explain our data.
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Table 1.9: Regression results: Model human capital on log real income per capita
Regression on log yt
Estimate Standard Error R2 N
OLS 0.098*** 0.008 0.57 112
Dynamic Panel 0.106*** 0.002 - 112
Conclusions and future extension
Utilizing data collated from the decennial censuses, Planning Commission re-
ports and the Ministry of Human Resource Development, we are able to construct
measures of human capital from 1951 through 2011 for the states of India in their
present form, correcting for several intra-national changes of boundaries. A time se-
ries spanning these many years did not exist before. We are also able to construct
average per worker output across the states, and provide estimates of returns to ed-
ucation consistent with existing literature. Further, we fit an endogenous fertility
choice model to the time paths of fertility and education in the states, accounting for
the distribution of declining mortality rates across the states and increase in oppor-
tunity cost of space. The returns of the human capital estimates generated by our
model closely match those of our data. One piece of work left for the future is the
construction of physical capital estimates for each of the states individually, so as to
separate the returns to physical and human capital. To achieve this, a measurable
and accurate proxy has to be found, because no official records of subnational physical
investment exist. Another possible extension is to examine differentials in returns, if
any, between the classes of employment and types of education (vocational or various
majors) across time. Lastly, we would be interested in an examination into whether
distributional of educational expenditures and land use and infrastructural develop-
ments match up to our calibrated costs of education and rental rates, respectively.
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We delegate that task to a future body of work.
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Table B.1: Modern States of India and their creation
State Formation
Assam January 26, 1950
Bihar January 26, 1950
Jammu and Kashmir January 26, 1950
Odisha January 26, 1950
Tamil Nadu January 26, 1950
Uttar Pradesh January 26, 1950
West Bengal January 26, 1950
Andhra Pradesh October 1, 1953
Karnataka November 1, 1956
Kerala November 1, 1956
Madhya Pradesh November 1, 1956
Rajasthan November 1, 1956
Gujarat May 1, 1960
Maharashtra May 1, 1960
Nagaland December 1, 1963
Haryana November 1, 1966
Punjab November 1, 1966
Himachal Pradesh January 25, 1971
Manipur January 21, 1972
Meghalaya January 21, 1972
Tripura January 21, 1972
Sikkim May 16, 1975
Arunachal Pradesh February 20, 1987
Mizoram February 20, 1987
Goa May 30, 1987
Chhattisgarh November 1, 2000
Uttarakhand November 9, 2000
Jharkhand November 15, 2000
Telangana June 2, 2014
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Table B.3: Average years of experience
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Andhra Pradesh 18.06 17.29 17.32 18.96 18.46 19.78 14.44
Assam 15.83 15.51 14.77 15.36 15.57 16.18 11.68
Bihar 17.20 15.83 17.02 16.88 15.24 15.16 10.34
Delhi 15.81 14.58 13.67 14.57 13.85 14.52 9.20
Gujarat 17.11 15.37 16.80 17.92 17.05 18.22 12.11
Haryana 16.40 14.74 14.97 15.10 14.45 15.45 10.31
Himachal Pradesh 19.04 22.26 17.05 18.56 18.35 18.94 12.00
Jammu and Kashmir 16.00 16.13 14.99 16.49 16.34 17.17 9.83
Jharkhand - - - - - 15.76 10.78
Karnataka 15.97 16.41 15.92 17.44 18.13 19.26 13.02
Kerala 16.76 17.01 16.83 15.68 17.29 8.96 12.87
Madhya Pradesh 17.67 16.12 17.12 17.75 16.83 16.97 11.75
Maharashtra 16.52 16.41 16.64 19.20 17.97 18.33 11.97
Odisha 17.89 17.19 16.32 17.71 17.98 18.52 12.55
Punjab 15.86 14.52 16.00 18.53 16.34 17.16 12.33
Rajasthan 17.27 15.47 15.81 15.89 15.53 16.59 11.45
Tamil Nadu 18.95 17.99 18.23 20.33 20.53 20.96 14.27
Uttar Pradesh 18.12 16.22 16.52 15.81 13.91 15.56 10.10
Uttarakhand - - - - - 17.42 10.16
West Bengal 19.26 15.10 15.68 16.04 16.71 18.34 13.16
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Table B.4: Proportion of population deemed illiterate in Census Years
(1-Proportion literate of any education level)
States/Union Territory 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 0.70 0.60 0.49 0.37 0.27 0.19 0.14
Andhra Pradesh 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.56 0.40 0.32
Arunachal Pradesh 0.93 0.89 0.74 0.58 0.46 0.33
Assam 0.81 0.67 0.66 0.47 0.37 0.27
Bihar 0.87 0.78 0.77 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.36
Chandigarh 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.14
Chhattisgarh 0.91 0.82 0.76 0.67 0.57 0.35 0.29
Dadra & Naqar Haveli 0.82 0.67 0.59 0.42 0.22
Daman & Diu 0.29 0.22 0.13
Delhi 0.38 0.35 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.13
Goa 0.77 0.65 0.48 0.34 0.24 0.18 0.13
Gujarat 0.78 0.69 0.63 0.55 0.39 0.31 0.21
Haryana 0.74 0.63 0.44 0.32 0.23
Himachal Pradesh 0.36 0.24 0.16
Jammu & Kashmir 0.87 0.78 0.69 0.44 0.31
Jharkhand 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.65 0.59 0.46 0.32
Karnataka 0.70 0.63 0.54 0.44 0.33 0.24
Kerala 0.53 0.45 0.30 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.06
Lakshadweep 0.85 0.73 0.48 0.32 0.18 0.13 0.08
Madhya Pradesh 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.61 0.55 0.36 0.29
Maharashtra 0.72 0.65 0.54 0.43 0.35 0.23 0.17
Manipur 0.87 0.64 0.62 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.20
Meghalaya 0.73 0.71 0.58 0.51 0.37 0.25
Mizoram 0.69 0.56 0.46 0.40 0.18 0.11 0.08
Nagaland 0.89 0.78 0.66 0.50 0.38 0.33 0.20
Orissa 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.51 0.37 0.27
Puducherry 0.56 0.47 0.35 0.25 0.19 0.13
Punjab 0.66 0.57 0.41 0.30 0.23
Rajasthan 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.70 0.61 0.40 0.33
Sikkim 0.82 0.66 0.43 0.31 0.18
Tamil Nadu 0.64 0.55 0.46 0.37 0.27 0.20
Tripura 0.80 0.69 0.50 0.40 0.27 0.12
Uttar Pradesh 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.59 0.44 0.30
Uttarakhand 0.81 0.82 0.67 0.54 0.42 0.28 0.20
West Bengal 0.75 0.66 0.61 0.51 0.42 0.31 0.23
INDIA 0.82 0.72 0.66 0.56 0.48 0.35 0.26
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Table B.5: Total Fertility Rates
State 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Andhra Pradesh 5.39 5.57 4.68 4.07 3.10 2.35 1.85
Assam 7.02 6.06 5.80 4.24 3.53 3.06 2.46
Bihar 6.27 6.32 6.12 5.79 4.49 4.38 3.81
Delhi 4.17 4.47 3.49 2.93 2.64 2.15 1.80
Gujarat 6.44 6.55 5.71 4.44 3.17 2.93 2.53
Haryana 7.23 7.20 6.82 5.16 4.08 3.19 2.36
Himachal Pradesh 1.56 1.35 1.14
Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu andKashmir 2.45 1.95
Jharkhand 3.56 2.96
Karnataka 5.73 6.01 4.54 3.65 3.16 2.47 1.92
Kerala 4.94 5.05 4.22 2.93 1.86 1.78 1.84
Madhya Pradesh 6.47 6.68 5.68 5.24 4.67 4.00 3.20
Maharashtra 5.60 5.77 4.72 3.68 3.05 2.46 1.86
Odisha 5.91 6.22 4.80 4.35 3.40 2.65 2.24
Punjab 6.85 6.03 5.31 4.11 3.17 2.50 1.87
Rajasthan 6.62 6.60 6.37 5.30 4.65 4.07 3.12
Tamil Nadu 4.68 4.88 3.97 3.48 2.29 1.99 1.79
Uttar Pradesh 6.40 6.25 6.63 5.87 5.26 2.77 2.95
Uttarakhand 4.74 2.33
West Bengal 6.51 6.83 5.21 4.28 3.30 2.47 1.77
Average 6.01 6.03 5.25 4.34 3.38 2.87 2.29
Max 7.23 7.20 6.82 5.87 5.26 4.74 3.81
Min 4.17 4.47 3.49 2.93 1.56 1.35 1.14
Table B.6: Parameter values used in calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α 0.275 µ 0.085
ψ 0.66 τ 0.3825
φ 0.55 a 0.4007383
θ 0.125 Λ 2.014584
A 1.55 p 1
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Figure C.36: a) Taste and δ, b) κ and rent for West Bengal
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Chapter 2
Economic freedom and the Solow
model: An empirical analysis of
the states of India
Abir Mandal
We consider Acemoglu’s (2005) stress on institutions as the main determinant
of economic growth for the states of India. We then correct Pattanaik and Nayak’s
2013 work on the economic freedom of the states by incorporating a more traditional
augmented Solow-type model to include measures for capital accumulation and hu-
man capital index and use more recent data, till 2013. We go on to apply a Okun’s
law-based econometric framework to study the effect of economic freedom on un-
employment. Last, we discuss the relationship between economic freedom and the
proportion of people living in poverty.
For a country like India, finding the appropriate recipe for long term growth
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in income is very important. While India is the 3rd largest economy in the world
with a GDP of 9.6 trillion dollars (PPP), it ranks 121st in per capita income ($ 6000,
PPP), because it is also the 2nd most populated in the world, with a 2014 population
of around 1.2 billion. Further, while GDP grew about 8%, with a population growth
of 1.3% , in 2015, there exists a wide disparity in levels and growth of incomes. For
example, the small state of Goa, off the west coast of India, has a per-capita income
of almost 7 times that of Bihar. The World Bank (2016) estimates that roughly a
quarter of Indians live in abject poverty, with an income of $ 1.25 a day, PPP. Such
a situation brings with it, of course, malnutrition, lack of access to health care and
education, and, consequently, a poverty trap. The National Health and Family Survey
for 2012 estimates that 45.9% of all children under 3 years of age are underweight,
while almost 80% have anemia. Access to safe drinking water is limited and according
to World Bank statistics (2014), 1600 people die each day due to water-borne disease-
based diarrhea. In rural areas, covered excretion facilities are available to a mere 14%
of the population!
Disparity is prevalent even in growth rates-some states are growing as fast as
16% (Sikkim, 2005-2014), while others have failed to derive the benefits of a dynamic
national economy. From these data, it appears that some states either did not have
the “preconditions”, if any, necessary for rapid growth or somehow lost their way.
Understanding why some states have thrived while others have not is an important
factor to determine whether there is anything that the government can do to pull the
hundreds of millions out of poverty.
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Determinants of growth
Should we take Solow seriously?
The neoclassical growth model suggests that poor states will be able to grow
relatively faster than richer states and will eventually catch up to the latter’s income
levels via faster capital accumulation and absorption of technology from the developed
world. The key assumptions in the model are as follows: (1) there are diminishing
returns to capital, (2) all countries have access to new technologies and, (3) the
savings rate is similar across countries in the long run. Due to a lower level of the
initial capital stock in developing countries, the marginal product of capital is higher
therein, thus permitting a higher rate of return to investment and faster rate of income
growth. Since technological progress– rather than capital accumulation– is the only
driving force of long-run growth, convergence is achieved once the poor countries reach
the same level of capital stock as that in the developed world. However, if there are
barriers to adopting new technologies, developing countries can fail to converge to the
living standard of the developed world. We must ask, then, why such barriers exist.
Though there is no direct answer, some reasons could include restrictions enacted by
government and high opportunity cost of human capital.
Freedom and Growth
Some researchers propose a fatalistic view of economic growth: some states
grow and others fail, and there is not much we can do about that. Institutionalists
argue otherwise. Putting aside implications of causality, it can be seen that successful
economies have some things in common. One of the most important among them
are free markets– the unfettered ability of people to make trades– which allow each
individual to pursue the accumulation of the returns to their individual activities while
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making him pay for the related costs. In most cases, it allows the most efficient use of
resources in an economy, since each individual is the best judge of his proximate costs
and the amount of welfare accruing to him from acceding to said costs. The aggregate
increase in surplus by means of such individual transactions leads to economic growth.
Objectively measuring economic freedom can be difficult. Therefore, most
researchers focus on quantifiable correlates to compare economic freedom across po-
litical entities. These include, among other things, tax rates, size of government, days
taken to fulfill regulations preliminary to start businesses, etc. Efforts to this end are
not new. Dahl (1971) and Claude (1976) made the earliest attempts to benchmark
countries in terms of economic freedom. Gastil (1987), whose data commenced in
1973, constructed a dataset for a majority of countries. However, he focuses on po-
litical and civil liberties, rather than economic liberties, even if such rights are quite
often parallel. Due to the era in which they were constructed, many of such economic
freedom indices suffered from lack of accuracy, regularity of data collection, and scope
of constituent information actually available. By virtue of better data, contemporary
indices, are far superior.
At present, there are two main compilers of data related to economic freedom
around the world. The Heritage Foundation, in collaboration with the Wall Street
Journal, publishes its Index of Economic Freedom annually, ranking countries based
on averages across scores in 10 broad categories. These comprise of: (1) rule of law
(enforcement of property rights, levels of corruption), (2) government size, measured
using government spending, (3) regulations (business freedom, labor laws and mon-
etary regime; and (4) market structures, including trade and investment freedom.
Started in 1995, the rating derives its data from sources like The Economist’s Intel-
ligence Unit to construct its rating for almost every country in the world. The data
(Heritage Foundation, 2015) reveal that countries considered mostly free or moder-
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ately free, as per the index, have a poverty rate of about a quarter of those considered
less free. The authors also observed that per capita incomes (which are higher in freer
countries as well, ceteris paribus), free countries enjoy far superior human develop-
ment indicators than their less free counterparts. Although Heritage’s analysis did
not control for other variables, the authors also found strong correlations between
economic freedom and growth, both in the short-run and long-run.
The Fraser and CATO Institutes, in collaboration with many other similar
think tanks around the world, cover countries from 1980 onward with their Economic
Freedom of the World report, which has a more libertarian perspective than its Her-
itage counterpart. This index is also more detailed, accounting for 42 variables under
the broad heads of government size, security of property rights, soundness of money,
trade barriers and economic regulation. The index (Gwartney J., 2015), in its 19th
year of publication, covers 157 countries and finds that Hong Kong and Singapore,
like in 2014, occupy the top positions in 2015. Lesser known and now discontinued,
Freedom House used to publish a ranking of countries starting in 1996 using six in-
dicators covering the freedoms to hold property and trade, both domestically and
internationally.
Within the United States, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University
publishes its own ”Freedom in the 50 States” (Ruger and Sorens, 2009), which ranks
the states of the country based on economic factors, including the level of state in-
come and sales taxes, and social freedoms. The challenge with adequately measuring
the quality of institutions, like economic freedom, for the states of India– especially
going significantly back in time– is precisely the historically bad quality of Indian
institutions. An extensive, stretched bureaucracy, dating back to the British, try-
ing to micromanage all aspects of the economy without mastery in any one aspect
implied poor performance in even seemingly valid functions of the government, like
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the aggregation of economic data. India has to contend with the Economic Freedom
Index, as published by CATO/Frasier Institute, covering 20 states, for whom data
are available at the moment.
Barro (1996) uses indices composed by Gastil for roughly 100 countries to
determine a non-linear positive relationship between political freedom and economic
growth, also positively related to rule of law, for the period 1960-1994. De Haan
and Sturm (2000), in their analysis of 80 countries for the period 1975-1990 find that
an increase in economic freedom accelerates economic growth. Scully (2002) asserts
that the measures of economic freedom compiled by CATO (2014) have a positive
relationship with economic growth for 26 wealthy countries over the period 1975-1990.
A similar relationship was found by Weede and Kämpf (2002) for 72 countries during
1970-1995 using the index of economic freedom compiled by CATO (2000). Cebula
(2013) shows that economic growth is increasing in economic freedom and decreasing
in government deficits for a panel of 28 OECD countries over 2003-2008. From these
studies we can conclude a strong relationship between variables commonly associated
with economic freedom and economic wellbeing of a country.
De Haan and Siermann (1998) used Scully and Slottje’s (1991) measures for
economic freedom to demonstrate that some quantified constituents of economic free-
dom were related to economic growth, while others were not; this was derived from
a sample of 78 countries for the period 1980-1992. Besley et al. (2004) show that
legislatively giving more influence to unions at the expense of employers (a reduction
in business freedom) leads to lower real wages and growth in India. Campbell and
Snyder (2012) surmise that it is a lack of economic freedom that leads to natural re-
sources turning into a ‘resource curse’ for a cross-section of countries. Williamson and
Mathers (2009) posit that while culture, including work ethics, matters for economic
growth, it loses importance as a driver of growth once the level of economic freedom
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reaches a critical level.
Carlsson and Lundström (2002) show that while economic freedom is good for
economic growth, certain components included by many authors have insignificant or
negative effect on GDP. Compton et al (2011) observed a similar result for the states
of the United States of America. Fabro and Aixalá (2012) show that for a sample
of 79 countries over the period 1976-2005 that economic freedom increases economic
performance by improving the allocation of resources and stimulating investment.
Justesen (2008) established causal links from some aspects of economic freedom to
economic growth while noting insignificant evidence of reverse causality for a panel
of 79 countries for the years 1970-1999. Pattanaik and Nayak (2014) did examine
the effect of economic freedom on the per capita income in Indian states and found a
positive relationship between the two. However, they fail to use any accepted theory
on growth as the basis for their econometric model. They also fail to account for
multicollinearity in their analysis of the components of the economic freedom index.
Taking into account the existing literature, we contribute the following value.
First, this paper uses an accepted structural estimating model for Indian states,
grounded in established economic theory instead of regressing as many explanatory
variables as possible on the level of economic development. Thus, we are able to
estimate a production function for the economies of the Indian states. We treat
growth in a similar manner. Second, we include measures for capital investment
and human capital investment for each Indian state for all the time periods under
consideration. Next, we put forward migration as the reason for the anomaly of
economic development and growth being positively related to population growth in
some studies, ours included. Finally, we acknowledge the political economy by making
a case for politically feasible reforms to improve economic freedom by studying its




We assume that, given correlation, economic freedom leads to higher growth
and a higher consequent level of development. This direction of causality has been
established by prior research (Vega-Gordillo and Alvarez-Arce, 2003; Justesen, 2008).
In my estimation, there are no countries which, first, grew fast in the absence of eco-
nomic freedom and then established a more laissez-faire economy consequently. We
start with human capital-augmented model used by Mankiw et al. (1992) (MRW) and
further augment it with economic freedom. Similar to Prochniak’s (2013) treatment
of institutions, we introduce economic freedom as a factor of production. This is dif-
ferent than the methodology behind Nonneman and Vanhoudt’s (1996) introduction
of ”technological know-how” as a different form of capital, since growth is diminish-
ing only in direct factors unless, some augmenting factor is introduced to perpetuate
macroeconomic performance.
We assume that access to technology is the same for the entire country. While
technology changes over time akin to the AK model, this change is captured by fixed
time effects. It is the same for all states in a particular year and does not need to be
explicitly modeled since we are looking at the other determinants of growth, given a
certain level of technology. Thus, it is a belief that the economic freedom-augmented
Solow model, with time effects, is a reasonable assumption to study the states, as
opposed to others (an AK model, for example), which would add more complications
without adding significant information. Like MRW, we assume that state-specific
differences unrelated to physical or human capital levels, or to economic freedom
are random. We begin with a generic Cobb Douglas production function for GDP,
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with the usual properties, augmented with human capital, H, and some measure of
economic freedom, E.
Y = KαHβ(AL)1−α−βEρ (2.1)
In per unit of effective labor terms, (2.1) becomes,
y = kαhβEρ (2.2)
Here, the form of the function ensures that economic freedom is separate from
the other means of production but influences the returns to each of them.
The time paths for capital and human capital in our model are:
k̇ = skk
αhβEρ − (n+ a+ δ)k (2.3)
ḣ = shk
αhβEρ − (n+ a+ δ)h (2.4)
At the steady state, capital, human capital, and output per unit of effective





















































Equation (2.6) allows us to verify the effect of some measure of economic
freedom on the level of economic development of a state.
MRW estimated the human capital augmented growth rate of the economy as:
lny(t)− lny(0) =(1− e−λt) α
1− α− β




− (1− e−λt) α + β
1− α− β
ln(n+ a+ δ)− (1− e−λt)lny(0)
Applying similar Taylor expansion to our economic freedom augmented model, we
arrive at the following estimating equation for growth:
lny(t)− lny(0) =(1− e−λt) α
1− α− β




+ (1− e−λt) ρ
1− α− β
lnE − (1− e−λt) α + β
1− α− β
ln(n+ a+ δ)
− (1− e−λt)lny(0) (2.7)
where, for both versions of the growth estimating equations,
λ = (1− α− β)(n+ a+ δ) > 0 (2.8)
Equation (2.7) demonstrates that growth depends both on the means of pro-
duction and economic freedom. Given our assumptions on parameters, a higher level
of freedom corresponds to a higher growth rate. Using the data derived in the next
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section, we attempt to verify the validity of our hypothesis with regards to economic
freedom for the states of India.
Let













1− eλt = κ, κγ1 = θ1, κγ2 = θ2, κγ3 = θ3, κγ4 = θ4
So, the two equations for the level and growth, respectively, become:
lnY/L = γ0 + γ1lnsk + γ2lnsh + γ3ln(n+ a+ δ) + γ4lnE + µ (2.9)
and growth,
g = κ+ θ1lnsk + θ2lnsh + θ3ln(n+ a+ δ) + θ4lnE + κlny(0) + ν (2.10)
Theory dictates that we should see a positive sign for γ1,2 and θ1,2 and negative
signs on κ, γ3 and θ3. In addition, if economic freedom, as measured by the instrument
chosen, has a positive effect on the level of economic development, we expect to see
a positive sign on both γ4 and θ4.
Data and methodology
Per capita GDP and growth
Data on GDP are taken from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Im-
plementation’s annual report for 2014. These reports present national account and
state-level macroeconomic numbers as they become available. As per the data, among
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the states included in our analysis, the industrial state of Maharashtra had the highest
income in 2013, at Rs 69,000 (2004 prices, 6272 PPP$). Bihar, despite its abundant
natural resources, had a per capita GDP of Rs 15,000 (2004 prices, 160 PPP$). The
latter, however, exhibited the fastest income growth among the states that year, at
8%, in contrast to Orissa, whose per capita GDP shrank by a little less than 1%
the same period. Data were obtained for the panel of states for 2005, 2009, 2011,
and 2013, the years for which the freedom index was calculated by CATO/Fraser.
All incomes and related variables are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price
index for 2004.
Labor force growth
Annual work force growth data are not available from the Indian government.
Neither are annual data on population growth, often used as a proxy for labor force
increases, since state populations are enumerated once every 10 years, over the course
of the national Census. The last Census was conducted in 2011. In order to ar-
rive closer to instantaneous estimates of population growth for our study, state-wise
growth rates for 1991-2001 and 2001-2011 were obtained from the Census reports.
Growth for each study year was calculated by assigning weights based on relative lo-
cations of said year with respect to the two extracted data. To put it simply, the first
census dataset contributed more to the first two periods under study (2005, 2009)
than to the last two (2011, 2013). Even if our numbers are not entirely accurate, we
believe that the values we obtain are at least proportional to the true figures, relative
to each state. In the absence of countervailing information, we assume technology
growth and depreciation to be constant for the entire country, at 2% and 3%, at par
with similar studies, respectively. We add 0.05 to the population growth estimates
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obtained above to get our estimation for n + a + δ, as in the estimating equations
((2.6), (2.7)).
For 2013, Bihar had the fastest population growth, followed by Jammu and
Kashmir, at estimated values of 2.26% and 2.15% per annum, respectively. On the
other hand, Kerala grew at a mere 0.48%, as per our estimates. Growth is slowing
over time, as expected for a country that is on an economic growth trajectory, from
an average of around 1.8% for the country as a whole in 2005, to 1.6% in 2013.
Capital accumulation
Unlike for the national accounts, India does not collect or release state level
savings, investment or capital formation data. If we are to actually estimate a Solow-
type model for the states,we need a good proxy. We assert here that following (Pur-
field, 2006), private sector credit would be one such measure. First, most new invest-
ment in Indian is financed via loans from commercial banks. These include, both,
new installations and expansions of existing facilities. Further, King and Levine
(1993) show that there is a strong association between private sector credit and cap-
ital accumulation for eighty countries over the 1960-1989 period. Thus, as a proxy,
outstanding credit for all commercial banks, data for which are available annually,
was used. Data were extracted for the four time periods from the databank of the
Reserve Bank of India, which publishes these data annually, and have been expressed
in per capita terms for each state.
Human capital
The level of human capital stock has been proxied by the female literacy rate
for each state. This is following Barro and Sala-i martin (1996). The reasoning be-
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hind this is twofold: (1) there would be an obvious correlation between the female
literacy rate and the overall education level of a state. The more interested a state
is in educating its women, instead of relegating them to domestic duties, the more
intellectually forward looking it can be considered. (2) Educated mothers are also
better informed about bringing up their children, leading to better nutritional and
health outcomes. Consequently, this leads to higher productivity for the next gen-
eration of workers. Thus, female literacy has an indirect additional contribution to
human capital above and beyond its correlation with direct educational measures.
This would also naturally allow for convergence as a larger share of the female popu-
lation of a state acquires education. Data were extracted from the National Sample
Survey Office data bank, via data.gov.in.
We also have available to us the estimate of average years of education in the
workforce as derived in Chapter 1 for years 2001 and 2011. While we do not have
data for all the years for the current analysis, we interpolate the years of education
values for 2005 and 2009, and extrapolate the values for 2013. In doing so, we further
verify the effect of economic freedom on the development level and growth rate of an
economy. We caution that these are not real data and should not be taken as such,
but we believe the model would be further validated if it holds up to examination
using our constructed data.
Economic freedom index and components
Data on economic freedom were downloaded from CATO’s website, which
contains the 2013 version of the Economic Freedom Index, as well as archives the
older editions.
CATO/Frasier Institute’s economic freedom index for Indian states draws on
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premises very similar to those used to calculate the index for the countries of the
world. However, given the demarcation of rights of the state and central governments
as set in the Indian constitution, the authors chose to use three areas (as compared
to the five used for the index of countries) as measures amenable to change via the
state governments. These are:
 Size of government: expenditures, taxes and enterprises
 Legal structure and security of property rights
 Regulation of labor and business
Details of the methodology used to rate states in each area can be obtained
from the report. Each component is given a score between 0 and 1, 1 being the
highest. The three areas are then then averaged to obtain an overall score. One
strength of these ratings is the fact that the report reveals that no subjective weights
were assigned to the components of the scores, lending them objectivity and credible
freedom from researcher bias. In order to normalize the scores between 0 and 1, the
creators of the index simply subtracted the minimum score from the states’ scores
and divided by the range. The maximum and minimum values are the same for all
the four editions of the scores used in our analysis, ensuring these are comparable
across time.
In the 2013 ratings, Gujarat scored the highest overall, 0.65, while Bihar had
the lowest rating of 0.31. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh were the other states
considered as relatively more economically free, while Assam, Jharkhand, and West
Bengal are on the other end of the spectrum. Overall, states have become absolutely
more free, even as the relative positions have changed. The average score for economic
freedom in 2005 was 0.38, which has now improved to 0.42. The summary of the data
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indicates that the states that have improved the most in terms of their scores have also
grown the fastest over this period, in terms of state GDP, not controlling for other
variables. Gujarat has grown at more than 10%, while Chhattisgarh and Andhra
Pradesh have both grown in excess of 8.5%, between 2005-2013.
All the variables above have been converted to their natural logarithms to
conform to the estimating equations, with the additional advantage of being amenable
to their coefficients being interpreted easily.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of data
Average STD Max Min
Per capita income 41897.25 17418.38 69584 15506
Income growth 4.92 2.24 7.7 -0.94
Economic Freedom 0.42 0.08 0.65 0.31
Female Literacy 65.69 9.78 92.07 51.5
Credit outstanding 0.03 0.02 0.12 0
Population growth 1.61 0.43 2.26 0.48
Results
In this section, we run regressions to validate the economic freedom- aug-
mented Solow model, and compare results to those obtained using the original and
MRW models. A pooled panel regression was performed on the data using the two
linear estimating models. An F-test allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis of
no fixed effects, so a one way fixed time effects estimator was used. Bihar and Ut-
tarakhand were dropped from the analysis because they were outliers. Bihar has an
excessively unreliable data collection mechanism, while Uttarakhand is a new state,
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for which the Ministry of Statistics had to estimate a lot of the parameters using
assumptions that may or may not have been based on reality.
Level of economic development
Table 2.2 tabulates the regression results of our model versus those for the base
Solow and Mankiw-Romer-Weil’s human capital augmented models. As compared to
the latter two, our model is able to explain a slightly larger amount of variation
in the per capita income across states. The R2 indicates that our model is able
to explain 91% of the difference in the level of per capita income across states in
India. This is extraordinarily high! According to our results, almost all of the income
differences across the states of India can be explained by three variables: physical
capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and how free the people are to
conduct their businesses. If anyone called for a simple recipe for growth, it is uncertain
that we would be able to provide recommendations outside of augmentation of these
three areas. These results imply that richer states invest more in physical and human
capital and have governments that favor a Laissez-faire approach to the economy.
Further, our results align with theory. All variables, with the exception of the
population growth rate, have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level.
The results show that for an increase of 1% in the economic freedom index, we can
expect a 0.4% higher per capita income, all else equal, higher than for more physical
capital. However, returns are higher for the human capital accumulation measure
and to the measure of human capital. A glance at the data for the states illustrates
why this model is believable. There is no relatively rich state in India with a lower
than the average Indian level of workforce quality (proxied by female literacy rate),
as seen by the kinds of companies that have chosen to set up operations therein, and
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with a greater than average level of difficulty in conducting business.
Of course, when we run OLS regressions we assume that explanatory variables
determine the dependent variable. However, it may be mentioned that it is indeed
likely that richer states will have more left to invest in capital and human capital,
leading to higher incomes later.
Finally, in this section, we estimate the production function for Indian states.
Based on the estimates of the parameters, we find α = 0.15, β = 0.40, ρ = 0.18. Thus,
the production function, Y = KαHβ(AL)1−α−βEρ implies Y = K0.15H0.40(AL)0.45E0.18.
Labor has roughly 3 times the share of income of physical capital, but has slightly less
than the income share of physical and human capital taken together. The economic
freedom elasticity of income is estimated as 0.18.
In per capita terms, we have y = k0.15h0.40E0.18.
Table 2.2: Level of economic development
Solow MGW EF Augmented
Dependent variable: level of per capita GDP












Log of economic freedom index
0.40***
(0.1)







R2 0.83 0.88 0.91
*** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5%, * sig. at 10%
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While the sign on the (n + g + δ) parameter is the opposite to theory, it
may be explained by the fact that we used population growth as a proxy for labor
force growth; this is limited since we are unable to control for migration. In India,
migrants typically move from impoverished areas with low economic opportunities to
more dynamic places with employment demand and contribute to population growth.
Further, this also is consistent with research by Hasan (2010), who found that in the
short run, population growth is endogenous and positively related to income. Thus,
taking into account both these aspects of demographic change, the population growth
rate may not be entirely exogenous to our model, and a larger population may, in
fact, be consequent to a higher level of economic development . While the data we
have does not allow for tests of endogeneity, they reveal something about migration
patterns, as we discuss in the following section.
Migration and per capita GDP
Here, we examine the potential relationship between labor force immigration
to a state and its per capita income, as a possible explanation for the positive empir-
ical relationship between the strength of an economy and its population growth. In
India, as opposed to the practice in other developing countries (most notably China)
migrants are not required to report any migrations to the government. However, the
Indian Census is able to account for migrations by noting any distinctions in the
answers for place of last residence and place of current residence. Therefore, we have
some information on interstate migrations. Since the census is conducted only once
per decade, and the 2011 census has not been decomposed state-wise yet, the latest
year for which state-level migration data are available is 2001. Thus, due to only a
cross-section being available, we cannot use migration as a control for a regression
analysis on the level of economic development with economic freedom; instead, we
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look at correlation measures.
The data tell us that roughly 14% of the population in India are migrants
from other states. This consists of around 42 million people, and includes both men
and women. For the purpose of this study, however, we only consider male migrants,
because males are more likely to migrate for work, attracted to economically more
lucrative places. Women, although a substantial contributor to migration patterns,
move mainly due to marriage instead of economic reasons.
Research by Bhagat and Mohanty (2009) shows that the two largest contrib-
utors of emigrants are Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, also two of the poorest states in
India. The main destinations for migrants, according to the same study, are Maha-
rashtra, Delhi, Haryana and Gujarat, some of the richest states. This would imply
that richer states would have a higher population growth than that predicted by the
Solow model, while the poorer states would have a lower population growth. Table
2.3 shows the overall pattern of migrants within the borders of India.
Table 2.3: Migrants within India (2001)
Category Number of Migrants Percent of population
Total Population 1,028,610,328
Total Migrations 307,149,736 29.9
Migrants within the state 258,641,103 84.2
Migrants from within the districts 181,799,637 70.3
Migrants from other districts of the state 76,841,466 29.7
Migrants from other states in India 42,341,703 13.8
Migrants from other countries 6,166,930 2
The Pearson correlation coefficient for GDP per capita and the proportion of
male migrants in each state is 0.84 (see Figure 2), significant at the 1% level. While
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the data are not detailed enough to comment on the causality in either direction,
they do not contradict our hypothesis that a higher per capita GDP attracts a higher
population growth by means of migration, also leading to a correspondingly lower
population growth in low income states, as workers unable to find work or a high
enough wage move out.
Growth
This model was less successful in explaining the variance in growth rates of
the states, explaining only 39% of the difference across the nation. The low number
may be based on the possibility that economic growth evolves over the a long period
of time, as in economic freedom today leads to higher growth rates much further into
the future. Unfortunately, due to absence of long-term, historical state-level economic
freedom data, we are unable to test the validity of this explanation. Nevertheless, our
model model has some successes going for it. The coefficient on the base year GDP is
negative, implying a minute degree of convergence across states. This is in line with
theory, which states that due to declining returns on the means of production, poorer
states will grow faster than richer ones, ceteris paribus, to eventually catch up to the
latter’s level of development. The results indicate that the poorer states have some
hope of equaling the quality of life of the rich ones.
Moreover, the estimate of the parameter on capital accumulation is positive,
as expected. A higher level of capital accumulation via investment implies a higher
growth rate, although the standard error was too high for the estimate to be statis-
tically significant. The estimate for human capital is positive and significant at the
1% level, as is the parameter on economic freedom. Our results indicate that hu-
man capital accumulation and economic freedom are far more important to economic
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growth than is physical capital accumulation. Again, we acknowledge that contrary
to theory, the coefficient on (n+ g + δ) is the opposite of what we expect.
Table 2.4: Per-capita GDP growth
Solow MGW EF Augmented
Dependent variable: Growth in per-capita income












Log of economic freedom index
0.08***
(0.02)














R2 0.18 0.27 0.39
***, **, * - sig. at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively
Model validation: Interpolated years of education
Based on our results, it appears that the effect of economic freedom on both
level and growth of the economy is valid even when we use the generated values of
years of education. Using the economic freedom augmented Solow model, we estimate
that a state with 1% higher economic freedom score can expect a .44% higher per
capita income, as well as .076 percent points of higher growth. These values are
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significant at the 1% level.
As an aside, a 1% increase in the average years of education in the workforce
for a state is associated with an almost 1% higher per capita income as well as a .087
percent point increase in growth rates.
Table 2.5 provides the regression results for this specification.





























***, **, *- sig. at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
These findings increase our confidence in the significant positive effect of eco-
nomic freedom on the economic wellbeing in the states of India.
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Politics of economic freedom
Economic growth aside, the politics of India are such that parties compete
on reductions in the rates of unemployment (whether via economic growth or via
tax-funded job programs) and poverty (welfare spending is a tool used to reduce
poverty). This section attempts to make the case for policies that increase economic
freedom by quantifying its effects on joblessness and the number of people under the
abject poverty-thresholds defined by the government from time to time. To examine
the relationship between poverty and economic freedom, the proportion of people
living under $1.25 a day was extracted for each state for 2005 from the website of the
Ministry of Development. For similar purposes, the unemployment rate, expressed in
person per 1000 population, was downloaded for 2005 from the Ministry of Labor’s
databank.
Unemployment
To examine the response of unemployment to economic freedom, we use a
version of Okun’s law. There exists a negative correlation between economic growth
and the rate of unemployment in an economy, a phenomenon empirically documented
for US data in the 1960s. While the relationship is not always stable, most economists
believe in some form of the Okun’s law, as documented by Ball et al (2014).
We use the rate difference form of the relationship for the purpose of this
analysis. In the difference form,
∆Ut = β0 + β1∆Yt + ωt
, where Ut is the unemployment rate in time t, and Yt is the GDP. Using logarithms
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to conform to the data we have,
lnUt = β0 + β1gt + ω (2.11)
We add to Equation (2.11), our measure for economic freedom to see how it
effects unemployment, controlling for GDP growth, giving us our estimating equation:
ln u = β0 + β1g + β2lnE + ω (2.12)
This will allow us to estimate the economic freedom elasticity of unemployment.
Table 2.6: Unemployment rate
Dependent variable: Log of unemployment rate
Log of economic freedom index
-1.05***
(0.39)
Growth rate of GDP
0.02
(0.41)
*** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5%, * sig. at 10%
According to our data, the sign on the regressor for economic freedom is neg-
ative with respect to the unemployment rate and is significant at the 1% level, as we
expect. For a 1% increase in the economic freedom index, we can expect to see the
unemployment rate to fall by 1.05 %.
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Poverty
To study the effects of economic freedom on poverty, we take into account
Tendulkar et al. (2009), for the now defunct Planning Commission, under the Indian
government. The report details the threshold income levels needed for a household
to be considered as ”Below Poverty Line”, thus qualifying for certain forms of public
assistance. The poverty lines for each state, overall, as well as for rural and urban
areas separately are detailed in the appendix.
In general, India has made substantial progress in the reduction of poverty
across the country. Data extracted from government databases reveal that overall
poverty fell from 37.2 % in 2004 to 21.92 % in 2011. They also reveal that some
states have done much better in that respect than others.
Normalized by initial poverty levels, states like Andhra Pradesh and Uttarak-
hand have made the most progress against poverty, while Assam and Jharkhand are
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on the opposite end of the spectrum.
Table 2.7: Economic freedom and poverty
Poverty and Economic Freedom Correlation Matrix
EF 2005 EF 2011 Avg. Freedom
Poverty in 2011 -0.36 -0.45* -0.46**
Reduction in Poverty (2004-2011) 0.53** 0.42* 0.52**
***,**,*- sig. at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
The correlation matrix shows that states with more economic freedom have
done better. States with a higher level of economic freedom in 2005 should expect
to see a lower proportion of population below the poverty line in 2011, as well as
a significantly higher reduction in their poverty levels between 2004 and 2011. The
same applies for states with a higher average level of economic freedom through the
two years.
Figure 1 in Appendix A confirm these relationships.
Conclusions and future ideas
India is set up as a federal republic, whose state governments have quite a bit of
leeway in setting policy. It is also clear that some states have succeeded in improving
the lot of their populations while others have fallen woefully short. In this work, we
augmented a Solow-type growth model to include measures for economic freedom for
Indian states to estimate the effects of related institutions as a possible explanation
for the differentials in growth paths and levels of income. We found that high levels of
economic freedom and human capital are very strongly associated with higher incomes
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and growth, thereof. Further, analysis of unemployment and poverty data revealed
a strong negative nexus between the two variables and economic freedom, showing
the path that political parties may adopt to make its case for market reforms in a
country that desperately needs it.
This body of research can perhaps be made better by analyzing the individual
components of economic freedom to see which aspects affect economic performance
the most. However, that would require more data for us to successfully deal with the
obvious multicollinearity of the sub-parts. Another interesting avenue would be to
bring in some measures of location, in line with Jefferey Sachs’ work, to control for
other aspects like natural resources and access to ports.
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Fabro, G. and Aixalá, J. (2012). Direct and indirect effects of economic and political
freedom on economic growth. Journal of Economic Issues, 46(4):1059–1080.
Gastil, R. (1987). Freedom in the world. Greenwood Press.
Ghosh, S. C. (2000). The history of education in modern India, 1757-1998. Orient
Longman, New Delhi.
Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., and Block, W. (2014). Economic freedom of the world.
Cato Institute.
Gwartney J., Lawson R., H. J. (2015). Economic Freedom of the World: 2015 Annual
Report. Fraser Institute.
Hasan, M. S. (2010). The long-run relationship between population and per capita
income growth in China. Journal of Policy Modeling, 32(3):355–372.
Heritage Foundation (2015). 2015 Index of Economic Freedom.
Jones, C. I. (2001). Was an Industrial Revolution Inevitable? Economic Growth Over
the Very Long Run. Advances in Macroeconomics, 1(2):1–43.
Justesen, M. (2008). The effect of economic freedom on growth revisited: new evidence
on causality from a panel of countries 19701999. European Journal of Political
Economy.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S. (2002). Does the mortality decline promote economic growth?
Journal of Economic Growth, 7(4):411–439.
90
Kalemli-Ozcan, S. (2003). A stochastic model of mortality, fertility, and human capital
investment. Journal of Development Economics, 70(1):103–118.
King, R. G. and Levine, R. (1993). Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3):717–37.
Kothari, B., Pandey, A., and Chudgar, A. R. (2004). Reading Out of the ”Idiot
Box”: Same-Language Subtitling on Television in India. Information Technologies
and International Development, 2(1):23–44.
Kumar, C. R. (2004). International Human Rights Perspectives on the Fundamental
Right to Education - Integration of Human Rights and Human Development in the
Indian Constitution. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 12.
Loraine Kennedy, K. R. and Zamuner, D. (2013). Comparing state-level policy re-
sponses to economic reforms in india. Revue de la regulation [Online].
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., and Weil, D. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Nonneman, W. and Vanhoudt, P. (1996). A further augmentation of the solow model
and the empirics of economic growth for oecd countries. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, pages 943–953.
Pattanaik, F. and Nayak, N. (2014). Economic freedom and economic growth in
India: What is the empirical relationship? Economic Change and Restructuring,
47(4):275–298.
Pedersen, J. D. (2001). India’s industrial dilemmas in West Bengal. Asian Survey,
41(4):646–668.
91
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Figure 1: Economic freedom and poverty
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Figure 2: Migration and economic development levels
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